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Chapter 3 
Playing Fair with Recidivists 
. * Richard Dagger 
Introduction 
Persistent offenders present serious problems for both the theory and practice of 
criminal justice. As a practical matter, persistent offenders threaten public safety 
and strain public resources. First-time offenders pose their own challenges for 
the police and courts, of course, but it is the recidivists-those who have been 
caught and convicted more than once-who crowd the prisons and other "cor-
rectional facilities." 1 
Where the theory of criminal justice is concerned, the problem is to deter-
mine whether there is any justification for "recidivist enhancement" or "the re-
cidivist premium." The public seems to think that repeat offenders are in some 
sense guiltier, or deserving of harsher punishment, than those found guilty of a 
first offense.2 In some jurisdictions, this sentiment has found expression in laws 
that require harsher sentences for recidivists, most famously in the "three strikes 
and you're out" laws in California and many other parts of the United States. 
But are legislatures justified in passing such laws? Is public sentiment perhaps 
out of step with what justice itself demands? These questions are particularly 
pressing for those of us who take a broadly retributive approach to the punish-
ment of criminals. If the point of punishment is in some sense to pay back the 
offender for the wrong that he has done, or to mete out punishment according to 
his just desert, then it is not at all obvious that someone should be punished 
more severely for his second offense than for his first, and more severely for the 
third than for the second, and so on. If the offense is virtually the same in every 
case-say, the theft of a car worth $10,000.00-then it would seem that retribu-
tive ju~tice demands the same punishment in every case. · 
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Retributivists thus face a difficult challenge. Either we must go against the 
social grain, and perhaps our own intuitions, by insisting that a criminal offense 
carry the same penalty or punishment no matter how many previous convictions 
an offender has accrued; or we must find a way to justify the recidivist pre-
mium. I shall take the second route here by arguing that recidivism itself is a 
kind of criminal offense. In developing this argument, I shall rely on Youngjae 
Lee's insightful analysis of "recidivism as omission."3 I shall complement his 
analysis, however, by grounding it in a conception of criminal law as a coopera-
tive practice-a grounding that Lee's defense of the recidivist premium other-
wise lacks. In doing so, I shall incorporate Lee's "recidivism as omission" into 
the familiar theory that justifies punishment as a matter of fair play.4 
Recidivism as Omission 
Lee is not the first to defend the recidivist premium in retributivist terms, and he 
takes care to set out and criticize others' attempts before advancing his own 
theory of "recidivism as omission." He argues, for example, that it is a mistake 
to base enhanced punishment on the bad character or defiant attitudes of repeat 
offenders. Instead, he claims, the proper approach is to regard the recidivist as 
someone who has not only broken the law again but as someone who has omit-
ted to take seriously the lessons of his or her previous punishment. The sum-
mary statement of Lee's position is worth quoting at length: 
The culpable omission that justifies the recidivist premium is the repeat of-
fender's failure, after conviction, to arrange his life in a way that ensures a life 
free of further criminality. Although how individuals conduct their lives as a 
general matter is not properly the business of the state, once offenders are con-
victed of a crime, they enter into a thick relationship with the state, and that re-
lationship gives rise to an obligation for the offenders to rearrange their lives in 
order to steer clear of criminal wrongdoing. This Article has also argued that 
obligations between the state and offenders run in both directions, and that we 
should recognize the ways in which the state may be a responsible actor that 
should share the blame for a recidivists' reoffending.5 
Lee's account is not completely satisfactory, as I shall explain below, but I do 
believe that it points the way to the justification of the recidivist premium. To 
begin with, Lee makes a strong case in support of his claim that "recidivism as 
omission" avoids the problems that beset other retributivist attempts to justify 
harsher punishment for recidivists. In the case of the "bad character" argument, 
as he acknowledges, it may well be true that recidivism is an indication of bad 
character traits. It does not follow, however, that we should punish the recidivist 
both for the new offense he has committed and for the character flaws that led 
him to commit it. That is, to return to the example of the car thief, the bad-
character argument would have us impose on the repeat offender the same pun-
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ishment he received for his previous conviction for car theft plus the premium 
of extra punishment for his bad character. But to do this, as Lee points out, is in 
effect to punish a person not for breaking the law but for displaying certain 
character traits. Such punishment might be appropriate if those character traits 
always and necessarily manifest themselves in criminal behavior, but it is not at 
all obvious that they do, or even that such traits exist. On the contrary, the char-
acter flaws typically associated with criminal conduct-malice, callousness, and 
insensitivity to others' interests, for example-are often evident in conduct that 
is unquestionably legal, if not admirable.6 
The attempt to ground the recidivist premium on the repeat offender's defi-
ant attitude or disrespect for law is also unsatisfactory. As Lee notes, there are 
well-established legal offenses, such as contempt of court and resisting arrest, 
that aim at persons whose defiance would obstruct the course of justice or inter-
fere with the rule of law.7 The question, though, is whether a general proscrip-
tion of a defiant attitude toward the law is warranted. In liberal societies that 
encourage people to subject their governing officials to scrutiny, and occasion-
ally celebrate those who engage in civil disobedience, the answer seems to be 
no. That being the case, it is difficult to see how defiance or disrespect in itself 
can justify enhanced punishment for the recidivist. 
Lee's solution to the problem of the recidivist premium, as previously noted, 
is to hold persistent offenders accountable not for their bad characters or defiant 
attitudes but for their failure to conduct their lives, after conviction, "in a way 
that ensures a life free of further criminality."8 On his account, in other words, 
the recidivist is guilty of two new offenses: first, of committing the crime(s) that 
make him a repeat offender; and second, of omitting to conduct his life in a law-
ful manner, as his earlier punishment(s) should have taught him to do. For the 
crime of commission, the recidivist should receive the same punishment she 
would receive were she a first-time offender; for the omission-that is, the fail-
ure to act on the lessons of her earlier punishment(s)-she deserves the extra 
punishment that we call the recidivist premium. 
As the subtitle of his essay indicates, it is also important to note that Lee's 
approach to recidivism is "a relational account." The state and the offender, to 
use his terms, have a "thick relationship" with each other that begins with the 
offender's first conviction, and the state's right to impose harsher punishment 
on recidivists than on first-time offenders grows out of this relationship. More-
over, the relationship is in some sense reciprocal. As Lee says, "obligations be-
tween the state and offenders run in both directions, and ... we should recog-
nize the ways in which the state may be a responsible actor that should share the 
blame for the recidivists' reoffending."9 Before the agents of the state impose 
additional punishment on recidivists, they should be sure that they have dis-
charged their responsibility by making it possible for the offender "to arrange 
his life in a way that ensures a life free of further criminality." 10 If prisons are 
little more than schools of crime, and if the convict faces legal barriers to em-
ployment, housing, and support when he leaves prison, it will be unfair to hold 
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him accountable for omitting to live a law-abiding life. On Lee's account, then, 
the recidivist premium is grounded in the relationship between the state and the 
offender, and the state must take its responsibilities as seriously as the offender 
must take his. 
In my view, Lee's account of the recidivist premium is the most plausible 
and persuasive to be advanced by a retributivist. Yet it is not without its prob-
lems. One problem is his characterization of the omission that makes the recidi-
vist liable to additional punishment, and another involves the "relational" aspect 
of his argument. 
'The key to understanding the recidivist premium," Lee says, "lies in seeing 
that a self continues over time, and that the self at t1 can influence what the self 
does at t2 • ••. The key to the recidivist premium lies not just in evaluating an 
individual's act of reoffending or bad character traits. Rather, the focus should 
be on the ongoing relationship between the offender and the state." 11 After his 
initial conviction, then, the offender is engaged in a "thick relationship" with the 
state that requires him to conduct himself at t1• t2 ... tn in a way that will keep him 
from committing another crime. If he fails-if he does commit a new offense-
then the state may hold him accountable not only for the offense but for what he 
failed to do at, say, ti. when he renewed his acquaintance with people who had 
encouraged his earlier crimes, or at t5, when he gambled away much of the little 
money he had. Such activities may not be criminal in themselves, but they do 
represent the kind of omission for which the state may invoke the recidivist 
premium at t0 , when he stands convicted of another offense. 
Suppose, however, that we have two first-time offenders, Sally and Sam, 
who have served their sentences and are now conducting themselves in ways 
that are likely to lead them back into criminal activity. That is, Sally and Sam 
both take up with the kinds of people who are likely to land them in trouble, and 
Sally and Sam both begin to gamble heavily. But Sally does not commit another 
crime-perhaps because she wins enough while gambling to remove the appar-
ent need for money-while Sam does. Sam is then caught, convicted, and sub-
jected to the recidivist premium, while Sally, who is equally guilty of omitting 
to arrange her life to stay free of criminality, goes unpunished. It seems, in 
short, that Sam's omission cannot be what justifies the imposition of the pre-
mium in his case, since the unpunished Sally is equally guilty of that offense, so 
it must be his commission of the new offense. Either that or the enhanced pun-
ishment is simply unjustified (on retributive grounds). 12 In either case, recidi-
vism as omission fails to account for the recidivist premium. 
The proper response to this objection is not to give up on Lee's recidivism as 
omission but to recognize that his argument requires elaboration and clarifica-
tion. One might hold, for example, that Sally is indeed culpable insofar as she 
has omitted to conduct herself in a way that will keep her free of criminality. 
Like Sam, she is in a "thick relationship" with the state, and the state has the 
right to punish or penalize her for her offense of omission. Such a person will 
not be subject to the recidivist premium, however, because she is not, strictly 
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speaking, a recidivist. Nevertheless, she will be subject to punishment, penalty, 
or at least closer supervision on the part of parole or probation officers for her 
failure to conduct herself in the proper way. 
Unfortunately, this attempt at rescuing Lee's account of recidivism as omis-
sion leads to the unpalatable conclusion that someone ought to be subject to 
legal punishment for doing things that are not in themselves illegal. Associating 
with unsavory characters, drinking too much, and squandering one's money in 
(legal) gambling are not crimes, however likely they may be to lead to criminal 
activity. How then can we justify punishing someone like Sally for engaging in 
them when they do not-or have yet to-lead her to commit actual crimes? One 
might argue that some conduct that is open to ordinary, law-abiding citizens 
should be closed to those previously convicted of a criminal offense, but that 
position would be hard to square with the belief that those who have served their 
time, or otherwise met the terms of their sentences, have paid their debts to so-
ciety. The most we can justify in such cases, it seems, is the stricture that parole 
or probation officers ought to subject someone like Sally to closer supervision 
and frequent warnings about the dangers of her conduct, but not that they or 
others may punish her for doing what she may legally do. 
There is, however, a more promising way to elaborate Lee's analysis of re-
cidivism as a kind of omission. This approach calls for something akin to the 
"no harm, no foul" reasoning familiar in sporting events. We might hold, in 
other words, that offenders who keep bad company, gamble (at legal casinos), 
and drink immoderately are cause for concern, but that they should not be 
judged guilty of an offense of omission until they show that they cannot live in 
this way and stay free from criminality. If Sally can live in this way without 
committing another crime, but Sam cannot, then it seems reasonable to say that 
Sally and Sam are not equally guilty, as we had supposed, of omitting to arrange 
their lives so that they will remain free from criminality. Sally's conduct may 
be as misguided as Sam's, but it stops short of recidivism. It is the commission 
of the new offense, then, that justifies the state in looking backward to Sam's 
omission to conduct himself as he should have-and thus to the imposition of 
the recidivist premium. 
This approach, however, seems to have the unfortunate implication of turn-
ing Lee's "recidivism as omission" into a straightforward account of recidivism 
as commission. That is, if we follow the "no harm, no foul" rule, all that really 
matters is the foul-the criminal offense-and not the harmful misconduct that 
puts one on the path to criminality. This becomes clear when we consider what 
would happen, on this approach, if Sam makes a genuine effort to stay free from 
criminality, but fails, while Sally makes no such effort but somehow stops short 
of breaking the law. Suppose, for example, that Sam, despite his earnest inten-
tions, simply cannot resist breaking the law when he notices one day that some-
one has left the keys in the ignition of an unlocked car. Sally, meanwhile, in-
tends to steal a car, but is too weak or distracted to make the effort. Sam is 
guilty of car theft and Sally is not; but is Sam also guilty of omitting to live in a 
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way that will keep him free from criminality? Is Sally not guilty, as the "no 
harm, no foul" approach suggests? 
My view is that the answer to both of these questions is yes. Sam did try to 
live in a law-abiding manner, but he failed; at the crucial juncture he omitted to 
act as his prior conviction and punishment should have led him to act. Sally has 
not learned her lesson, evidently, but she has somehow stayed within the law. 
Sam therefore deserves punishment, including the recidivist premium, but Sally 
does not. Nevertheless, this reasoning seems to strain the claim that recidivism 
is a kind of omission. To reduce the strain, and to strengthen Lee's case for re-
cidivism as omission, we shall need to address the second problem with his 
analysis. 
This second problem is a matter of incompleteness, specifically the incom-
pleteness of the "relational account" Lee offers. Lee is right, I think, to direct 
our attention to "the ongoing relationship between the offender and the state"; 
and he is also right to hold that "[ w ]hen a person is convicted and punished for a 
crime, one thing we can say with confidence is that the relationship between that 
person and the state has changed in a way that makes that person different from 
others who have not had that kind of encounter with the state."13 How this rela-
tionship develops, however, and what its nature is, are matters that he does not 
explain. He offers an occasional hint in this direction, but nothing that can sat-
isfy someone who doubts that there is any significant relationship, thick or thin, 
that connects the recidivist to the state. 
Lee's "recidivism as omission," as a result, is a promising but incomplete 
account of the recidivist premium-promising enough, in my view, to give us 
reason to look for ways of completing it. That is the task I take up in the re-
mainder of this essay. To carry out this task, we shall need to ground Lee's ar-
gument for the recidivist premium in a broader theory of retributive punishment; 
and such a theory must itself be grounded in a conception of the political or le-
gal order that makes sense of Lee's "relational account." Such a conception will 
fill out his account of the relationship between offenders and the state, and it 
will do so in large part by turning our attention from the state-a term that con-
notes a remote, bureaucratic agency-and toward the polity-that is, toward the 
political or legal order understood as a cooperative practice in which legal pun-
ishment is a matter of fair play. 
Law, Punishment, and Fair Play14 
Although intimations may be found in earlier writers, the first clear formulations 
of this conception of the political or legal order appeared in the works of two of 
the most influential legal and political philosophers of the twentieth century, H. 
L. A. Hart and John Rawls. According to Hart, "when a number of persons con-
duct any joint enterprise according to rules and thus restrict their liberty, those 
who have submitted to these restrictions when required have a right to a similar 
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submission from those who have benefited by their submission." 15 What Hart 
called "mutuality of restrictions," Rawls a few years later designated the princi-
ple of fair play. "Suppose," he said, 
there is a mutually beneficial and just scheme of social cooperation, and that 
the advantages it yields can only be obtained if everyone, or nearly everyone, 
cooperates. Suppose further that cooperation requires a certain sacrifice from 
each person, or at least involves a certain restriction of his liberty. Suppose fi-
nally that the benefits produced by cooperation are, up to a certain point, free: 
that is, the scheme of cooperation is unstable in the sense that if any one person 
knows that all (or nearly all) of the others will continue to do their part, he will 
still be able to share a gain from the scheme even if he does not do his part. 
Under these conditions a person who has accepted the benefits of the scheme is 
bound by a duty of fair play to do his part and not to take advantage of the free 
benefits by not cooperating.16 
In these early formulations, Hart and Rawls spoke of rights, duties, and justice, 
but not of punishment. Their primary concern was with the principle of fair play 
as a grounding for political obligation, understood as the general obligation to 
obey the law. By a somewhat different route, however, Herbert Morris drew a 
connection between the fair distribution of benefits and burdens, on the one 
hand, and the justification of legal punishment, on the other. As he argued in his 
influential essay, "Persons and Punishment," "A person who violates the rules 
has something others have-the benefits of the system-but by renouncing what 
others have assumed, the burdens of self-restraint, he has acquired an unfair 
advantage. Matters are not even until this advantage is in some way erased .... 
[H]e owes something to others, for he has something that does not rightfully 
belong to him. Justice-that is, punishing such individuals-restores the equi-
librium of benefits and burdens by taking from the individual what he owes, that 
is, exacting the debt." 17 
Underpinning all three of these statements-Hart's, Rawls's, and Morris's-
is the idea that society, or the political or legal order, is a cooperative endeavor. 
That is, the principle of fair play only applies to those who are engaged in what 
Hart called a "joint enterprise" and Rawls a "scheme of cooperation." Worries 
about fairness and unfairness may arise in other contexts, as they do when 
someone complains that it is not fair for some people to enjoy natural advan-
tages, such as keen eyesight and a healthy constitution, while others are born 
with crippling disabilities. But fair play is a consideration that grows out of 
cooperative ventures, enterprises, or practices, in which the participants rely on 
one another and must make some sacrifice or bear some burden if the coopera-
tion is to prove beneficial. In other words, cooperative enterprises produce pub-
lic goods, and complaints of unfair play are likely to be heard when some peo-
ple try to be free riders who enjoy the benefits of the cooperative efforts of 
others without bearing their share of the sacrifice or burden. 
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That is why the attempt to ground political obligation or punishment on the 
principle of fair play begins by conceiving of society-or the political or legal 
order-as a cooperative endeavor secured by coercion. When it approaches the 
ideal of a cooperative endeavor, the political order enables us to work together 
for common purposes and to pursue in peace our private interests; but we can do 
these things only when others, through their cooperation, help to maintain this 
order. We must have rules, therefore, or conventions of some sort, for we need 
to know what the required acts of cooperation are; and we must see to it that the 
participants generally do what the rules require-that is, that they do their coop-
erative part. Indeed, in any but the smallest and most closely knit societies, 
simply having known procedures for making, enforcing, and interpreting the 
rules will be perhaps the most valuable of all public goods. For it is the political 
order, understood to include the rule of law, that makes it possible for people to 
go about their lives with a measure of security, pursuing various other goods, 
private as well as public, within its cooperative framework. As Jeffrie Murphy 
once made the point, "in order to enjoy the benefits that a legal system makes 
possible, each man must be prepared to make an important sacrifice-namely, 
the sacrifice of obeying the law even when he does not desire to do so. Each 
man calls on others to do this, and it is only just or fair that he bear a compara-
ble burden when his turn comes."18 
If a society is truly fortunate, little effort will be required to ensure wide-
spread compliance with its laws, for the members will act out of a desire to do 
their fair share of the cooperative work. Such good fortune is not to be relied 
upon, however. Fairness often demands that we do things for the sake of coop-
eration that we find unpleasant or burdensome, such as paying taxes, obeying 
traffic laws, and respecting the property of others. The temptation to be a free 
rider is often strong, and measures are necessary to secure the cooperative order 
against this temptation. Enforcing the laws is one of these measures, and pun-
ishment of those who break the laws is another. In Hart's words, "'Sanctions' 
are therefore required not as the normal motive for obedience, but as a guaran-
tee that those who would voluntarily obey shall not be sacrificed to those who 
would not. ... [W]hat reason demands is voluntary cooperation in a coercive 
system."19 
Punishment is justified, then, when the political order may be reasonably 
regarded as a cooperative enterprise. When it can be so regarded, and when 
other things are equal, the persons who disobey the law fail to meet their obliga-
tions to the cooperating members of society. Punishment under law serves as a 
means of assuring the law-abiding members of the enterprise that those who 
would take advantage of their cooperation by breaking the law will be subject to 
sanctions if they do. Those who do not play fair, in short, open themselves to 
punishment. In this way, the fair-play theory incorporates both forward-looking 
elements and the backward-looking point of view characteristic of retributivism. 
That is, the threat of punishment provides a measure of assurance to those who 
are willing to obey the law that others will not take unfair advantage of them; 
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otherwise obeying the law would have little point. But this assurance is secured 
only by punishing those who have taken unfair advantage of others by breaking 
the law. 
To put the ~oint another way, every crime is a crime of unfairness, whatever 
else it may be. ° Criminals act unfairly when they take advantage of the oppor-
tunities the legal order affords them without contributing to the preservation of 
that order. In doing so, they upset the balance between benefits and burdens that 
a cooperative practice requires, and they make themselves liable to punishment. 
In the terms of Lee's "relational account," the relationship between offenders 
and the state is better understood as a relationship between citizens, or members 
of a cooperative practice, who owe it to one another to bear their fair share of 
the burdens of maintaining that practice. 
Contracts, Communities, and Cooperative Practices 
To develop and clarify this account, it may be helpful to distinguish it from two 
other ways of conceiving of the political and legal order. On the first concep-
tion, political societies are essentially voluntary in nature, and their members 
stand in the same relation to one another as the parties joined by a contract. That 
is, the parties form or enter into the society in order to advance their interests, 
and they acquire obligations to one another when they do so. The political soci-
ety thus rests on the consent of its members as the classical social-contract theo-
rists held, even if their consent must be understood to be given tacitly or hypo-
thetically. 
The second conception of the political and legal order differs from the first 
in holding that political societies resemble families or traditional communities 
much more than they do voluntary associations. On this communitarian view, 
membership in and identification with the society is what counts, even when 
membership is not altogether voluntary. We do not choose the families into 
which we are born, the argument goes, yet we are members of families never-
theless, and that membership entails obligations to our families. In much the 
same way, we are born into communities or societies, and we have obligations 
to their members, whether we choose to undertake them or not. Nor is this to 
say that those obligations are forced or imposed on us in the way that unfortu-
nate British (and other) subjects of earlier times were sometimes impressed into 
military service. As Michael Hardimon argues, 
the metaphor of impressments is particularly ill-suited to the r9les associated 
with the non-contractual role obligations we are inclined to take seriously. It 
would simply be wrong to say that we are impressed into the roles of sons or 
daughters, wrong to say that we are impressed into the roles of brothers and sis-
ters, and wrong to say that we are impressed into the role of citizen. We do not, 
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it is true, choose these roles, but we are not impressed into them either. They 
are roles into which we are born.21 
The fair-play theory rests on a conception of the political order that falls be-
tween the contractarian and communitarian conceptions. This claim may sur-
prise some readers, for critics sometimes take the fair-play theorists' appeal to 
the mutual benefits of a cooperative practice to indicate that practices of this 
kind are essentially contractual. Matt Matravers, for example, holds that "fair 
play theory combines a contract-based understanding of social co-operation and 
a retributive account of punishment."22 In discussing Rawls's duty of fair play, 
Phillip Montague states that political obligations "are requirements of fair play 
that arise when people voluntarily enter into agreements to establish mutually 
beneficial and just schemes of social cooperation."23 These assessments, how-
ever, are mistaken. Fair-play theorists do not rely on a conception of the politi-
cal order as a voluntary agreement; nor do they believe that occasions for acting 
unfairly arise only when a person has agreed or consented to enter into a mutu-
ally beneficial scheme of social cooperation. On the contrary, such obligations 
are more likely to arise when people simply find themselves participating in a 
cooperative practice, never having thought of whether they should or should not 
enter into it. In this respect, the fair-play view is closer to the membership or 
communitarian account in holding that the obligations of membership are nei-
ther fully voluntary, as in a contract, nor wholly involuntary, as in the case of 
the impressed sailor. But neither are they exactly like the obligations that flow 
from membership in a family or traditional community. To conceive of the po-
litical order as a cooperative practice is, again, to take a stand between the con-
tractarian and communitarian views. Ronald Dworkin indicates as much in his 
own defense of the communitarian position. According to Dworkin, 
the best defense of political legitimacy-the right of a political community to 
treat its members as having obligations in virtue of collective community deci-
sions-is to be found not in the hard terrain of contracts or duties of justice or 
obligations of fair play that might hold among strangers ... but in the more 
fertile ground of fraternity, community, and their attendant obligations.24 
In short, the fair-play conception of the political order as a cooperative practice 
stands between the contractarian and communitarian positions because it does 
not rest on strictly voluntary agreement, on the one hand, and because it requires 
more than mere membership, on the other. It will no doubt be easier to secure 
obedience to the law and other forms of cooperation when the people engaged 
in a joint enterprise perceive themselves as members of an extended family or 
community, and fair-play theorists may well want to foster such a sense of 
membership or identity. But it is not necessary to their theory that they do so. 
What is necessary is that the people engaged in social cooperation under law 
or-at least a good many of them-understand that the benefits that they and 
others derive from this cooperation require them, as a matter of fairness, to do 
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their part, even when it is unpleasant to do so, and even when those to whom 
they owe their obligations of fair play are for the most part strangers. 
To be sure, communitarians may not be willing to concede that the fair-play 
conception of the political order is as different from their conception as I have 
claimed. To them it may appear that the appeal to fair play will have force or 
"bite" only when it rests on some pre-existing sense of community; for without 
that sense, how are we to see others as fellow participants in a cooperative prac-
tice?25 Fair play presupposes community, in other words, but once we recognize 
this point, we must also recognize that community or fellow feeling does the 
real work of justifying obedience to the law and punishment of those who do not 
obey. The appeal to fair play is simply a way of expressing this underlying reli-
ance on the bonds of community. 
We may concede the strengthening force of community, however, without 
conceding that the fair-play conception of the political order simply reduces to a 
form of communitarianism. I say this for two reasons. First, there is something 
distinctive about fair play that the appeal to community does not capture. This 
distinctive element becomes evident when we consider that appeals to fair play 
will be pointless in an ideal community-that is, one in which a truly powerful 
sense of fellowship or solidarity permeates all relationships among its mem-
bers-for in such a community everyone will cheerfully try to promote the 
common good. That such an ideal is seldom if ever attained is no doubt owing 
to the tug of self-interest. Even strong communities have to worry about cheat-
ers and free riders, and the force of the appeal to fair play owes as much to that 
worry as it does to the sense of fellowship or community. 
The second reason for distinguishing the fair-play account from the commu-
nitarian is that fair play continues to hold even as the sense of community weak-
ens. Again, it is important to note that the sense of community may help people 
to perceive that they are involved in a cooperative practice of some sort, and 
that perception in turn will almost certainly reinforce their commitment to the 
practice. Nevertheless, that is not to reduce fair play to the sense of commu-
nity-not unless we simply define "community" as involvement in a coopera-
tive practice. If we take community to entail direct or many-sided relationships 
among people, however, so that you and I are not members of the same commu-
nity unless, say, we live in the same town, know some of the same people, and 
are subject to the same laws, then it becomes clear that we can have duties of 
fair play to those who do not share membership in a community with us. 26 That 
is why I say that fair play continues to hold even as the sense of community 
weakens, as it surely has weakened in the modern state. The millions or hun-
dreds of millions of culturally diverse people scattered across hundreds or thou-
sands of miles in such a state may feel little sense of community with one an-
other, but they may still owe one another a duty of fair play to obey the law. 
This is to say that the conception of the political order as a cooperative prac-
tice differs from the communitarian conception in its emphasis on the rule of 
law. Families and traditional communities have their customs, rules, and norms, 
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of course, but their members typically do not regard themselves as participants 
in rule-governed enterprises. What counts most for them are the ties of affection 
and solidarity. Cooperative practices, however, are by their nature rule-governed 
-joint enterprises according to rules, in Hart's terms. When the practices in-
volve a small number of people, the rules are likely to be simple and tacit-
perhaps nothing more than the rule that "you do your part, I' II do mine, and no 
shirking." As cooperative enterprises expand, however, the rules will need to be 
more explicit and elaborate, so that we know what counts as your part of the 
cooperative effort and what counts as mine. When the cooperative practice is a 
political order, moreover, it will be necessary to have ways not only of stating 
and enforcing the rules, but also of making and unmaking them to adapt to the 
needs of the practice. The rules will now be laws, in other words, and this rule-
governed enterprise will be a political order (or polity) under the rule of law. 
Another way to make this point is to say that the political order is a kind of 
super- or meta-cooperative practice. That is, the political order provides a col-
lective good-cooperation under the rule of law-that makes it possible for 
people to pursue with some degree of peace and security other goods, including 
other, narrower public or collective goods. The members of a car pool, for ex-
ample, are engaged in a cooperative practice that provides them with benefits 
that they produce for themselves by taking in turns the burdens of picking up 
and driving those who are sharing the ride. But in order to produce those bene-
fits for themselves, they must also be able to take advantage of benefits pro-
vided by the legal order, such as the traffic laws that make it possible for them 
to drive in relative safety to the workplace, school, play group, or other destina-
tion. Unless they live in a libertarian utopia, wherein every inch of their journey 
takes place on privately owned roads governed by the owners' regulations, they 
must rely on the meta-practice of the law if their car pool is to be the joint ven-
ture for mutual benefit that they want it to be. 
One implication of this way of thinking about a system of laws is that such a 
system is necessarily political. As a meta-practice, the legal system must estab-
lish laws that make it possible for people to engage in other cooperative prac-
tices and to go about their individual lives. Laws by themselves are not suffi-
cient, however. The members of the car pool need traffic laws, but they also 
need traffic signals and roads on which to drive, and these require the collection 
and expenditure of funds. They also require that decisions be made as to where 
roads are to be built, what kinds of roads they should be, and where the signals 
should be placed, among other things. What is necessary, in short, is a political 
order operating under the rule of law. 
In a polity of this kind, the political order itself is a cooperative practice-or, 
more properly, a meta-cooperative practice. The laws in such an order will be 
the terms of fair cooperation, or of what the members take to be the terms of fair 
cooperation. Laws will need to be promulgated, and cooperation will need to be 
encouraged, but the laws themselves will become matters of debate and prod-
ucts of public decisions. "What laws do we need?" thus becomes a vital ques-
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tion, as do the related questions of who should make these laws, who should 
enforce them, and who should apply and interpret them. There is also, finally, 
the question of how to hold those who make, enforce, and apply the laws ac-
countable to the public-that is, to those who have not only duties but rights as 
cooperating participants in the political order. 
Conceiving of the legal order as a cooperative practice thus has a number of 
significant implications. Perhaps the most important of these, for present pur-
poses, is that conceiving of the legal cum political order as a cooperative prac-
tice helps to clarify the communicative aspect of the criminal law. According to 
a widely held view, legal punishment is, among other things, an attempt to com-
municate the wrongness of their actions to those who break the law, with the 
aim of bringing them into the fold or restoring them to the community or society 
whose standards they have violated. In Punishment, Communication, and Com-
munity, for example, R. A. Duff develops a "communicative theory" of punish-
ment, "according to which punishment should be understood as a species of 
secular penance that aims not just to communicate censure but thereby to per-
suade offenders to repentance, self-reform, and reconciliation."27 Similarly, Her-
bert Morris's paternalistic theory of punishment "relies essentially on the idea of 
punishment as a complex communicative act ... "; moreover, Morris takes a 
"communicative component" to be "a defining characteristic of punishment" 
that "in part distinguishes it from mere retaliation or acting out of revenge ... 
"
28 Especially interesting for the purposes of this paper is the fact that Youngjae 
Lee endorses this view in "Recidivism as Omission": "The institution of pun-
ishment," he states, "has a communicative, expressive dimension. When the 
state punishes, it condemns what the offender has done as blameworthy and it 
communicates to the offender that what he has done is wrong. Implicit in that 
message ... is that the offender is being punished for what he has done, and 
after his punishment is complete, he shall not offend again."29 
But what, we may ask, gives some of us the right or authority to communi-
cate our standards in this way? We may grant that punishment of lawbreakers is 
a way of communicating the community's, society's, or polity's displeasure 
with them, but punishment is typically an especially harsh and unpleasant form 
of communication. As such, it requires more justification than a remonstrance or 
mere expression of disapproval does. Such a justification may be found, how-
ever, in the offender's violation of the laws comprising the meta-practice that, 
ceteris paribus, supplies him or her with benefits through the cooperative re-
straint of others. As part of that practice, we give some of our members the au-
thority to arrest and punish those who do not respect the persons and property of 
the other members of the practice-that is, the other members of the polity. In-
sofar as the offender enjoys the benefits of the meta-cooperative practice with-
out fully contributing to their provision by bearing his or her share of the bur-
dens of obeying the law, then the offender in effect justifies the rest of us in 
punishing him or her. That is why the polity is justified in communicating its 
censure to the offender by means of punishment. 
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To put the point in terms of Lee's "relational account," the polity is justified 
in punishing an offender because he or she is engaged in a relationship with the 
other members of the polity-a relationship in which he or she failed to bear a 
fair share of the burdens of the cooperative practice. This justification of legal 
punishment supplies, in turn, the underpinnings for "recidivism as omission" 
that Lee's presentation of his theory lacks. Or so I shall now try to show. 
Relations, Recidivism, and Punishment 
For any retributive theory of the recidivist premium to succeed, the theory must 
explain how recidivists deserve harsher treatment than first-time offenders. In 
Lee's case, his "relational account" provides this explanation. As he says, 
the crucial difference between first-time offenders and repeat offenders is that 
the repeat offender has gone through a process with the state that has created a 
relationship with the state, and the point of that relationship was to ensure that 
whatever led the offender to the status of being a convict should be avoided in 
the future. It is that history of having had that relationship that first-time of-
fenders lack. And once a person enters into a thick relationship with the state 
through the process of conviction and punishment, it is appropriate for the state 
to attribute blame to how a person has increased the risks of criminal wrongdo-
ing over time. 30 
This is an important, but ambiguous, passage. On the one hand, Lee seems to be 
saying that the relationship between the repeat offender and the state is the prod-
uct or creation of the process that the offender went through upon his or her 
initial conviction and punishment. If so, the implication is that there was no re-
lationship between the offender and the state prior to that first offense. If there 
were no relationship, however, then difficult questions arise as to the state's 
authority to punish the offender in the first place. But perhaps Lee means, on the 
other hand, that every citizen or subject of a state is engaged in a relationship 
with that state, but it is only a thin relationship until or unless an individual "en-
ters into a thick relationship with the state through the process of conviction and 
punishment. ... "31 That thin relationship may be sufficient to justify the state's 
punitive authority in the first place, with the thick relationship then providing 
the warrant for the recidivist premium. Whether it is or is not what Lee in-
tended, this second reading of the passage above seems to be the sounder of the 
two. Even so, it leaves two questions unanswered: What is the nature of that 
thin relationship? And what is it about the first-offender's punishment that 
transforms it into a thick relationship? 
To answer these questions we must complement Lee's "relational account" 
with the fair-play justification for legal punishment that I have sketched in the 
preceding sections of this essay. Setting aside the "thin" and "thick" terminol-
ogy, the justification for the recidivist premium thus takes the following form. 
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Everyone who is a member of a polity-that is, of a political cum legal order 
reasonably regarded as a cooperative practice under the rule of law-is involved 
in a reciprocal relationship with the other members of that polity. The relation-
ship is reciprocal because all have an obligation of fair play to the others to bear 
their share of the burdens of maintaining the practice by obeying, ceteris pari-
bus, the law. Those who break the law make themselves liable to penalty or 
punishment, which is to say that their relationship to the law-abiding members 
of the polity undergoes a significant change. The offenders continue to be mem-
bers of the polity, but they are not, so to speak, members in good standing; they 
are, instead, free riders of a more or less vicious kind. If they are sentenced to 
punishment, their sentence will communicate to them the law-abiding members' 
disapproval and condemnation of their criminal deeds; but it should also convey 
the expectation that the offenders will have the chance to restore themselves to 
full membership. If they fail to take advantage of this opportunity-if they be-
come repeat offenders-they will in effect be offending doubly against the co-
operating members of the polity: first by committing another crime; and second, 
by omitting to live in a way that will keep them free of criminal trespasses 
against the other members. 
Lee's "recidivism as omission" makes sense, then, but only as part of a 
theory of punishment grounded in the principle of fair play. The recidivist is in 
effect guilty of a multiple failure to play fair-once for the first offense, again 
for the second, and so on for each new offense. After the first offense, however, 
each succeeding offense represents a double failure to play fair. That is, each 
new offense is a crime of unfairness, but it also is a failure to play by the rules 
that apply to the offender as someone who has been previously convicted of a 
crime. To return to the examples of Sam and Sally from §1, Sally is not playing 
fair with the law-abiding members of the polity when, following her punishment 
as a first-time offender, she does not act so as to keep herself free of criminality. 
Fair play requires more of her than that-or it will, at least, when the legal and 
penal systems give her a fair chance of living such a life. She has not commit-
ted another crime, however, and that is what makes her situation different from 
Sam's, who has. Sam is guilty of a double offense against fair play in that he has 
omitted to conduct himself in a way that will keep him free of criminality, and 
he has committed another crime. This crime may have occurred despite his sin-
cere intention to stay within the law, as in the case of his happening upon an 
unlocked car with its keys in the ignition, but he is nevertheless guilty of the 
criminal act and of failing to maintain the fair-play relationship with the other 
members of the polity. For the criminal act, he deserves the same punishment he 
would deserve as a first-time offender committing the same crime. He has been 
given a second chance, however, and his failure to take advantage of that chance 
to play fair is what justifies, as Lee says, the recidivist premium. Should he fail 
a third or a fourth time, or more, the polity will be justified in increasing the 
premium for his new and persistent offenses. Whether increasingly severe pun-
ishment will be efficacious is a question for criminologists to try to settle; but 
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there is certainly justification for reacting more strongly to someone who persis-
tently refuses to play fair. 
Conclusion 
At the beginning of this essay I noted that recidivism presents both practical and 
theoretical challenges to criminal justice. In the essay itself I have concentrated 
on the theoretical challenge of providing a justification of the recidivist pre-
mium on retributivist grounds. That challenge can be met, I have argued, by 
following Youngjae Lee in conceiving of recidivism as a kind of omission, but 
with the further step of complementing or supporting Lee's theory with an ap-
peal to the fair-play model of the political or legal order as a cooperative prac-
tice. If I am right, however, then it is also fair to say that meeting the theoretical 
challenge also has practical implications. 
These practical implications take two principal forms. First, there is the im-
plication that a proper justification for the recidivist premium may well serve to 
reduce the practical problems that recidivism presents. To put the point crudely, 
if we can get the theory right, then we should be able to take steps that will re-
duce the number of persistent offenders. The second implication is that getting 
the theory right means, in this case, that the theory must recognize, as Lee ar-
gues, that offenders and the state are engaged in a relationship that imposes re-
sponsibilities on both parties. On the offender's part, this is a responsibility to 
"ensure that whatever led [him or her] to the status of being a convict should be 
avoided in the future" 32 ; on the state's part, it is a responsibility not to make it 
virtually impossible for the offender to live within the law. Getting the theory 
right means, in other words, that offenders and law-abiding members of the pol-
ity have duties of fair play to one another. Failure to carry out these duties on 
the part of the offenders gives the polity the right to impose extra punishment on 
recidivists. The polity, however, also has a duty to play fair with the recidivists, 
and that duty is to arrange their punishment in a way that not only discourages 
them from becoming repeat offenders but also encourages them to become co-
operating, law-abiding members of the polity once again. Playing fair with re-
cidivists in this way offers some hope of reducing recidivism, thereby meet-
ing-or at least addressing-the practical as well as the theoretical challenge of 
recidivism. 
Notes 
*I am grateful to Geoffrey Goddu, David Lefkowitz, and an anonymous reader for valu-
able comments on an earlier draft of this essay. Special thanks are due to Y oungjae Lee 
for sharing his insights with me. 
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